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Simplified Courts Can’t Solve Inequality
Colleen F. Shanahan & Anna E. Carpenter
Abstract: State civil courts struggle to handle the volume of cases before them. Litigants in these courts, 
most of whom are unrepresented, struggle to navigate the courts to solve their problems. This access- 
to-justice crisis has led to a range of reform efforts and solutions. One type of reform, court simplifica-
tion, strives to reduce the complexity of procedures and information used by courts to help unrepresented 
litigants navigate the judicial system. These reforms mitigate but do not solve the symptoms of the larg-
er underlying problem: state civil courts are struggling because they have been stuck with legal cases that 
arise from the legislative and executive branches’ failure to provide a social safety net in the face of rising 
inequality. The legal profession and judiciary must step back to question whether the courts should be the 
branch of government responsible for addressing socioeconomic needs on a case-by-case basis. 
 State civil courts are at the core of the mod-
ern American justice system and they are over-
whelmed. These courts handle 98 percent of the 
tens of millions of civil legal cases filed each year, 
including those concerning people’s homes, fam-
ily relationships, and finances.1 About 75 percent 
of these cases involve at least one party without a 
lawyer, and there is little possibility this reality will 
change anytime soon.2 As a result, millions of peo-
ple each year struggle to navigate state civil courts 
to solve their problems.
In the face of this crisis, there are many calls for 
change. One is for more and different assistance 
for litigants. These reforms include creating a civ-
il right to counsel, or allowing paralegals or oth-
ers to represent individuals in legal matters just 
as lawyers do now. They include improving infor-
mation through explanatory documents or other 
materials to explain court processes. Another ap-
proach to reform seeks to simplify courts them-
selves: reducing the complexity of legal processes 
and systems so that ordinary people can navigate 
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them without lawyer assistance. Called 
court simplification, this approach is a logi-
cal, compassionate response to this quan-
dary: if people do not have access to the 
help they need to navigate the court sys-
tem as it is designed, why not redesign 
the court system so that people can nav-
igate it on their own? If unrepresented 
litigants could successfully navigate the 
procedures, forms, and interactions with 
clerks and judges in state courts, it would 
be an improvement on the status quo. 
The more modern-sounding versions of 
these ideas–like “legal design” or “legal 
tech”–have visceral appeal. Courts, state 
bars, and other institutions are investing 
in this approach.3
The need is real: the volume of cases 
in state civil courts overwhelms their re-
sources. The number of civil cases brought 
to state courts hovers around twenty mil-
lion per year.4 This number would be even 
greater if all civil problems were brought 
to court, but millions of Americans do not 
even attempt to resolve their problems 
through the court system.5 In some court 
systems, 80 to 90 percent of litigants ap-
pear without lawyers.6 The system is an 
adversarial one, designed for represent-
ed parties. But there is no right to an at-
torney in civil cases. There are not, nor 
are there likely to be in the future, the re-
sources to provide a lawyer in every civ-
il matter before the courts. An enormous 
number of Americans appear in state civil 
courts without any assistance to navigate 
the litigation process, and courts have no 
choice but to serve these litigants despite 
the mismatch between design and reality. 
State civil courts were not always so 
overwhelmed. In the 1970s, and even in 
the 1980s and 1990s, reported rates of 
pro se litigants were much lower, from 
the single digits to around 20 percent.7 
Around the turn of the century, scholars 
and judges started to call attention to the 
“dramatic increase” of pro se litigation.8 
There are some common explanations 
for this change. 
The first is the growth of poverty and 
inequality in the United States. There are 
over forty million Americans in pover-
ty, almost double the number in the mid-
1970s and a significant increase from the 
approximately thirty million people in 
poverty in 2000.9 Some types of civil cases 
can be logically tied to growing inequality, 
such as dealing with family matters, hous-
ing, and consumer debt.10 These types of 
cases directly reflect the problems an in-
dividual encounters when she struggles 
economically: she misses rent payments 
and her landlord attempts to evict her, her 
marriage or custody arrangements are un-
stable, and her unpaid bills are subject to 
collection. In each of these circumstanc-
es, a state civil court case is the ultimate 
result. In addition, litigants appearing 
without lawyers often explain that they 
do so because they cannot afford attor-
neys, so these same cases are likely to be 
ones in which the litigants are navigating 
the court system on their own.11
A second explanation is that the prob-
lem is not only an increase in the number 
of poor people and accompanying state 
civil court cases but also, because oth-
er branches of government have failed to 
respond to growing inequality, changes 
in the kinds of cases that state courts see. 
The executive and legislative branches 
have aggressively pared back social safety 
net programs, and the judicial branch is 
required to hear the cases that result. For 
example, since the welfare reform efforts 
of 1996, fewer welfare benefits are avail-
able for poor families with children. For 
poor families, child support now replac-
es rather than supplements welfare ben-
efits.12 The number of custodial parents 
with a support order has risen 44 percent 
since 1999.13 As a result, state courts–as 
the ones that handle child support issues 
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did two decades ago. As another exam-
ple, federal funds for public housing are 
as low as they were four decades ago.14 
Only one in four of the nineteen million 
families that qualify for housing assis-
tance receive it.15 Median rent has dou-
bled over the past twenty years.16 Increas-
ing inequality, higher rent, and less pub-
lic-housing assistance mean that millions 
of Americans face eviction each year, a 
process handled by state civil courts. Fur-
ther, eviction triggers a cascade of other 
problems that lead people back to state 
civil court, such as additional housing 
disputes, consumer debt, divorce and 
child custody, and child welfare cases. 
Courts cannot decline cases present-
ed to them, so the absence of action by 
the legislative and executive branches 
leaves courts managing litigants’ socio-
economic needs, which courts are nei-
ther designed nor equipped to address. 
A state family court judge in any county 
in America is likely to hear a case today in 
which a wife (who has no lawyer) seeks 
a divorce from her husband (who has no 
lawyer), custody of their child (who has 
no lawyer), and a protective order ask-
ing the husband to stay away from her be-
cause of threats and violence. Under state 
law, this is a dispute about domestic vio-
lence, divorce, and custody, appropriate-
ly resolved in a state civil court. 
If you sat in the preliminary hearing 
for this case, you would recognize many 
other problems wrought by inequality 
and the absence of safety net programs. 
You would hear allegations that the hus-
band struggles with substance abuse. You 
might infer that the wife suffers from un-
treated mental illness. You would hear 
that the wife cannot access affordable 
child care and cannot find a job with 
hours to accommodate this challenge. 
You would hear that both parties have 
housing instability, rotating staying with 
family and friends. You would hear that 
the family’s consumer debt is growing. 
You would hear that neither the husband 
nor the wife completed education be-
yond high school. 
The case is a matter of civil law, yet it 
presents a range of socioeconomic needs 
intertwined with inequality and its con-
sequences–problems that are not being 
addressed by the services and resourc-
es of other branches of government. The 
husband does not have access to afford-
able substance abuse treatment, afford-
able housing, or adequate educational op-
portunities. The wife does not have access 
to mental health care, affordable child 
care or flexible employment hours, af-
fordable housing, or adequate education-
al opportunities. Judges and courts faced 
with cases like these attempt to meet the 
challenge out of a combination of com-
passion, pragmatism, and legal obliga-
tion. State civil courts have been forced 
to expand their roles significantly. 
But are state civil courts the appropriate 
institution to address individual socio-
economic needs like untreated substance 
abuse and mental illness, domestic vio-
lence, and unstable housing that manifest 
in a society with stagnant wages and ris-
ing inequality? Court simplification and 
related access-to-justice reforms rest on 
the premise that more accessible courts 
would allow litigants to achieve justice or 
otherwise solve the problems they grap-
ple with in state civil courts. This might 
be true if state civil courts were not be-
ing asked to play their new, expansive 
role. But they are, and it is worth explor-
ing why courts might not be the appro-
priate institution to play this role, and 
why court simplification will not neces-
sarily lead to more substantive justice for 
low-income litigants.
First, the core purpose of civil courts is 
to resolve disputes between parties and, 
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as the legal scholar Frederick Schauer 
wrote, to “get the facts right.”17 In state 
civil courts, the judges are the key ac-
tors in a context in which the “fact find-
er is at the mercy of the parties.”18 But the 
reality of state civil court litigation is of-
ten entirely different from this ideal. The 
adversarial process breaks down when 
parties lack skilled legal counsel, as oc-
curs in most state cases, especially when 
an unrepresented, poor individual fac-
es a represented party such as a landlord 
or a bank. Even if the less powerful par-
ty receives more information or a simpler 
process, the more powerful party is still 
advantaged by representation and the ex-
pertise, relationships, and resources that 
come with it. Further, the less powerful 
party will continue to have the burden 
of the related social problems entangled 
with the legal dispute, which exacerbate 
the power imbalance. 
For example, a tenant in an eviction 
matter will surely benefit from informa-
tion that explains that lack of proper no-
tice is a defense against eviction and also 
explains the use of a standardized court 
form that elicits related facts from the 
tenant. At the same time, a landlord’s 
lawyer with expertise in this area of law 
who is a repeat player in this courthouse, 
with all the benefits that flow from that 
and with economic resources to de-
vote to the eviction proceeding, will still 
have more power in the dispute than the 
tenant. One indicator of this dysfunction 
in the system is the default rates in state 
courts, which show that large numbers of 
cases are resolved through one party not 
participating in the process. According to 
the National Center for State Courts, the 
results in 18 percent of landlord-tenant 
cases, 24 percent of debt-collection cas-
es, and 29 percent of small-claims cases 
were default judgments.19 Court simplifi-
cation might address some of this lack of 
participation, yet it does not address the 
inequality that underlies the asymmetric 
power in state civil courts.
Second, many of the problems that civ-
il courts handle are symptoms of inequal-
ity. The design of civil courts constrains 
the substantive law and procedural tools 
at their disposal to address these symp-
toms. By the time the tenant comes to a 
state civil court, she has already lost her 
job and failed to pay her rent, which the 
law says she can be evicted for. Court 
simplification might make the legal pro-
cess of eviction easier to navigate for the 
tenant, and perhaps allow her to identi-
fy a defense that delays her eviction or re-
duces the amount of money she owes her 
landlord, but the underlying problem re-
mains. Even in this improved scenario, 
the court’s capacity is limited. It could 
give the tenant thirty additional days be-
fore she loses her home because the land-
lord failed to provide sufficient notice, but 
it cannot help her with the other challeng-
es related to her eviction, such as find-
ing affordable child care, health care, or 
employment that leads to savings to pro-
tect against future eviction. Courts can-
not create and fund social safety net pro-
grams, expand the availability of afford-
able housing, or fulfill other functions of 
the legislative and executive branches. 
The socioeconomic needs that flow from 
inequality and push parties into civil 
courts cannot be simplified away within 
the judicial branch. 
To the extent that courts have histori-
cally and could in the future play a mean-
ingful role in addressing larger questions 
of inequality, that role has taken the form 
of adjudicating issues of rights writ large, 
and not addressing individual socioeco-
nomic needs in the absence of a social 
safety net. A focus on rights and system-
ic reform necessarily involves lawyers as 
core players who identify, build, and liti-
gate these resource-intensive and complex 
cases. Court simplification–especially the 
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version that contemplates a parallel set 
of rules and procedures for unrepresent-
ed parties–undermines lawyers’ ability 
to identify individual disputes from which 
these systemic cases emerge.20 This risks 
losing the collective law development that 
leads to systemic equality or equity for 
these same litigants. In trying to improve 
the litigants’ ability to navigate the over-
whelmed state civil courts, court simplifi-
cation may risk making inequality worse.
Finally, pursuing court simplification 
without challenging the idea that state 
civil courts should address socioeconom-
ic needs case by case runs the risk of con-
tributing to dissatisfaction with the judi-
cial system. If the structural problems un-
derlying the civil access-to-justice crisis 
persist, unrepresented litigants will con-
tinue to struggle in both the courts and so- 
ciety. Americans, regardless of party affil-
iation, are already skeptical of courts’ en-
forcement of public policy.21 Public dis- 
satisfaction increases the challenges for 
state courts: low public opinion of courts 
will not help convince legislatures that 
courts are underresourced. Low public 
opinion of courts, in its most extreme 
form, also risks undermining the balance 
of power in our democratic government 
by lowering the credibility of courts as a 
coequal branch of government. 
What if courts rose to the challenge 
presented by the failure of other branch-
es of government by developing the ex-
pertise, systems, and resources to address 
litigants’ socioeconomic needs so that 
their civil legal needs could be successful-
ly met? In the criminal court system, al-
ternative or problem-solving courts have 
tried something similar to this approach. 
Problem-solving courts are specialized 
courts focusing on a subset (often a very 
small number) of criminal defendants 
with shared needs for social services, on 
the belief that addressing these needs will 
increase compliance with the law. The 
court functions as a clearinghouse and 
catalyst for individuals to obtain services 
and address those needs. The goal of a 
problem-solving court shifts from pun-
ishment and incarceration to treatment 
of a social problem, like drug addiction 
or mental illness. Problem-solving courts 
have been heralded as great successes and 
proposed as a model for civil courts.22 
The success of problem-solving courts 
reveals why state civil courts are ill-suited, 
even in an idealized version, to address 
litigants’ socioeconomic needs. Criminal 
problem-solving courts have been suc-
cessful because they can offer defendants 
the chance to choose social services over 
incarceration. While criminal and civil 
litigants share unmet needs for social 
services, the punishment framework of 
criminal courts shapes both the courts’ 
role and the definition of success. Success 
is staying in drug treatment and thus not 
returning to jail (for noncompliance with 
treatment or the commission of a new 
crime). This message of success would 
hardly satisfy a civil problem-solving 
court. As New York’s former Chief Judge 
Judith Kaye, a pioneer of problem-solv-
ing courts, put it, 
the innovations discussed here–enhanced 
treatment, special staffing, and judicial 
monitoring–can accomplish only so much 
in an individual’s life. They are not going to 
make up for problems like chronic poverty, 
substandard education, shoddy housing, 
and inferior health care.23
Problem-solving courts create minia-
ture or partial versions of executive branch 
functions in the court systems. For exam-
ple, criminal problem-solving courts shift 
the location of care for the core service 
(such as drug treatment) from a social ser-
vice agency in the executive branch to the 
judicial branch. An unfair aspect of this 
shift, with systemic consequences in the 
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age of mass incarceration, is that it crim-
inalizes care: if a court participant does 
not use the care, the individual is subject 
to a criminal penalty to which they would 
not be subject if they had not participated 
in the problem-solving court.24 Problem- 
solving courts have been praised for sav-
ing state and local governments money 
by doing work that other branches of gov-
ernment used to do less successfully.25 
If the benefit of problem-solving courts 
is that they are functionally relieving the 
other branches of government of respon-
sibility for meeting social service needs, 
this new role is less a long-term solu-
tion than a short-term mitigation, which 
masks yet does not solve the problems of 
an insufficient social safety net in the face 
of growing inequality. 
Problem-solving courts were motivated 
by the belief that judges have an obliga-
tion to solve the problems people bring to 
court. Judges–and the legal profession–
do have an obligation to litigants who are 
forced to present state civil courts with 
their socioeconomic needs in the absence 
of other alternatives. But the judiciary 
and the legal profession should fulfill this 
obligation outside the courthouse. Rath-
er than accepting the theoretical, institu-
tional, and political shifts that have cast 
state civil courts as the agencies responsi-
ble for addressing individuals’ socioeco-
nomic needs, courts–and the legal pro-
fession as a whole–must actively ques-
tion whether they should be playing this 
role. The profession must resist the temp-
tation to address the consequences of this 
change without also insisting that the 
other branches of government provide a 
social safety net to deal with the conse-
quences for individuals of poverty and 
inequality.
About a decade ago, state courts used 
theories of inherent judicial power to 
stand up to state legislatures over issues 
of court funding. These same theories 
could prove useful in calling attention to 
the inappropriateness of the expansion 
of the role of state civil courts. If a state 
court system insisted on adequate fund-
ing to provide the services that state 
courts are implicitly being asked to pro-
vide, it could expose the flaws in this 
model and reveal that courts should not 
be playing this role. 
The most disadvantaged individuals in 
society are also those most hurt by state 
courts that are pressed into service as 
the government branch of last resort. It 
might seem inappropriate and political-
ly untenable for the legal profession to fo-
cus on better mental health care or hous-
ing support for low-income Americans, 
but there is a broader structural problem 
that threatens the profession’s self-inter-
est. If the civil court system continues to 
be asked to play this role, it will contin-
ue to struggle to function at all. By reset-
ting the balance of obligations among the 
branches of government, courts would 
have the opportunity to function as they 
are intended to. 
Changing the narrative of the role of 
courts in this era of crisis will require re-
vealing facts that are hard to come by. 
Much is hidden about the work of state 
civil courts. Court systems and scholars 
have begun to partner to research state 
court systems, and that research should 
include examination of the role that 
state civil courts are playing in address-
ing socioeconomic needs. Understand-
ing that role will help illuminate the path 
forward.26
Any change must begin with courts 
and lawyers refusing to blindly accept the 
courts as a last resort against the legisla-
tive and executive branches’ failures to 
address inequality. As a profession, law-
yers need to accept that court simplifi-
cation, self-help, unbundled legal ser-
vices, design thinking, and similar ideas 
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address only short-term symptoms and 
perpetuate the underlying problems. It is 
in the profession’s self-interest and con-
sistent with lawyers’ role as stewards of 
law and justice to resist the theoretical 
shift, and to advocate for courts doing 
less of what they are not well-suited to do 
and more of what they are. 
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